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ANCILLARY JURISDICTION AND THE JURISDICTIONAL
AMOUNT REQUIREMENT
I. Introduction
Federal district courts may exercise jurisdiction only to the extent prescribed
by Congress and commensurate with the Constitution. The general jurisdictional
statutes require that either the cause of action involve a federal question or the
parties be citizens of different states and that the matter in controversy exceed a
minimum dollar amount.1 Yet despite these specific legislative restrictions, courts
nevertheless adjudicate claims which lack these jurisdictional requisites. Spe-
cifically, if a federal court has properly exercised jurisdiction over a suit, it may
also adjudicate a claim ancillary to the main suit even though the ancillary claim
has no independent jurisdictional basis.
Ancillary jurisdiction reflects a general attitude that once a federal court
has jurisdiction over a claim, it should resolve all matters closely related to that
claim. Unfortunately, the concept of ancillary jurisdiction represents little more
than a collection of discrete situations in which courts have found it necessary
and proper to adjudicate additional claims. No significant unifying principle
connects the various applications of this concept. In spite of this vague develop-
ment, however, courts have not been hesitant to formulate general rules as to
ancillary jurisdicton. For example, while most courts have held that an ancillary
claim in a federal diversity suit needs no independent jurisdictional basis, this
general rule has developed primarily in situations where inclusion of additional
parties would otherwise destroy diversity of citizenship. There is no correspond-
ing significant case development, though, obviating the other jurisdictional re-
quirement: jurisdictional amount. Thus while courts have held that the qualify-
ing ancillary claim need meet neither the diversity nor jurisdictional amount
requirements, the basis for this assumption is questionable as to the jurisdictional
amount requirement.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted to liberalize and
simplify procedure in the federal courts. Rules as to impleader, interpleader,
intervention, cross-claims, and counterclaims define circumstances in which
multiple claims can be litigated together. However, claims which might qualify
under such rules do not necessarily meet the statutory jurisdictional requirements.
Accordingly, the developing concept of ancillary jurisdiction supplied the neces-
sary jurisdictional basis for those multiple claims possessing no independent
jurisdictional bases but sufficiently related to those claims over which the court
did have jurisdiction. Therefore, while the concept of ancillary jurisdiction
apparently did not expand federal court jurisdiction beyond the statutory limits,
it did expand the situations in which it could be exercised.
While it may seem preferable to make ancillary claims independent of
jurisdictional requirements, recent Supreme Court decisions cast doubt on the
validity of a court dispensing with the jurisdictional amount requirement. In
1 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332 (1970).
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class actions under Rule 23(b) (3) involving separate and distinct claims of
multiple parties, the Supreme Court has held that all parties must meet the
jurisdictional amount requirement. This requirement applies even where the
federal district court has jurisdiction over some of the multiple claimants.
This note will examine the potential impact of the Supreme Court's em-
phasis on the jurisdictional amount requirement in Rule 23(b) (3) class suits
involving separate and distinct claims and will then consider the effect of that
rationale on ancillary jurisdiction as used in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
II. Jurisdictional Amount in Class Suits
The Supreme Court first addressed the applicability of jurisdictional
amount to class actions involving separate and distinct claims in Snyder v.
Harris.' The Court held that where no named plaintiff met the jurisdictional
amount requirement in a diversity class action, the individual claims of class
members could not be aggregated to establish the requisite jurisdictional amount.
In Zahn v. International Paper Co.,4 the Court imposed the additional require-
ment that even where some parties had claims exceeding the jurisdictional
minimum, the claim of each class member had to meet the statutory jurisdic-
tional amount in diversity cases. While this judicial development of the juris-
dictional amount requirement in diversity class action suits involving separate and
distinct claims may be logically sound, the ultimate conclusion rests on at least
questionable premises, assumptions, and precedent cases.
A. The Rationale of Snyder
In Snyder v. Harris,5 a shareholder brought suit on behalf of herself and
other shareholders similarly situated for the excess over fair market value received
by members of the board of directors on the sale of their stock. The shareholder's
individual claim did not exceed the jurisdictional amount and the Court held
that this defect could not be cured by aggregating the claims of all the repre-
sented shareholders.
The majority opinion rested its holding on two separate bases: the estab-
lished judicial interpretation of "matter in controversy" and the burdensome
case load of the federal courts.
The first basis relies on both the statutory mandate that the matter in con-
troversy in a diversity suit meet a minimum jurisdictional amount requirement
and the judicially developed aggregation doctrine. Where more than one plain-
tiff brings suit, the aggregation doctrine allows the claims to be considered col-
lectively to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement where the claims are
joint and common but not where separate and distinct.6 The Court reasoned as
2 Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
3 394 U.S. 332 (1969). The majority in Snyder felt the Court had already addressed
this problem in Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939), and this interpretation will
be considered later in the note.
4 414 U.S. 291 '(1973).
5 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
6 Id. at 336-37.
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follows: (1) the judicial interpretation of "matter in controversy" precludes
the aggregation of separate and distinct claims to meet the jurisdictional amount;
(2) aggregation has specifically been disallowed in spurious class actions; (3)
Congress has implicitly sanctioned this judicial interpretation of "matter in con-
troversy"; and thus (4) the Court remains powerless to reinterpret "matter in
controversy" to allow aggregation of separate and distinct claims in a Rule
23(b) (3) class action.
While the logic is sound, the argument rests on questionable precedent
and a tenuous assumption as to legislative intent. The Court noted that Clark v.
Paul Gray, Inc.' extended the aggregation doctrine to class actions under the
originally enacted Rule 23.' However, nothing in the Clark case indicates that
the plaintiffs did other than join in bringing the suit. Such weak authority seri-
ously affects the validity of the Snyder holding.
The Court also failed to justify its impotence to alter its own "separate and
distinct" interpretation of "matter in controversy." This latter defect arises from
the Court's assumption as to legislative intent: Since Congress on occasion has
amended the jurisdictional dollar amount and yet failed to enact any interpre-
tation of "matter in controversy" contrary to the traditional judicial interpre-
tation, the aggregation doctrine is less judge-made law and more implicit legis-
lation.' The dissent notes that silence can also indicate an intention to abstain
from interfering with a developing concept.1" Even if silence did have some
significance, Congress' failure to object to the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 at
least suggests support for abolishing the "separate and distinct" doctrine as to
class actions. The Court emphasized that the jurisdictional amount require-
ment for separate and distinct claims controls over any procedural rules and in-
deed any rule attempting to change the stated definition of "matter in con-
troversy" would be an expansion of federal jurisdictional boundaries forbidden
by Rule 82."
The Court's second basis for its holding was that any change in the aggrega-
tion doctrine would defeat the congressional intent to lessen the federal case
load.'" The Court expressed concern that an interpretation of "matter in con-
troversy" allowing this class action would increase the already heavy case load of
the federal courts." However, the more probable effect will be to increase the
burden on federal as well as state courts since failure to recognize a class action
here would cause redundant litigation. Parties dismissed from federal court may
bring essentially identical actions in state court; even if a state class action were
initiated first, qualifying class members may instead opt to sue in federal court.
Congress has sought to alleviate this case-load burden by periodically in-
creasing the jurisdictional amount requirement. While this tactic affects all
7 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
8 394 U.S. at 336-37.
9 Id. at 339.
10 Id. at 348.
11 Id. at 337-38.




diversity actions, it is questionable whether it has succeeded.14 Since this sweep-
ing solution has been ineffective, it is even more questionable whether a jurisdic-
tional amount limitation on the much smaller category of class actions will
produce any significant reduction in the federal case load. In 1972, class actions
constituted only three percent of the actions pending in federal district courts. 5
Of these, approximately 75 percent were civil rights, antitrust, or securities, com-
modities and exchange suits.' Since most of these were probably based on fed-
eral question jurisdiction, it would be reasonable to estimate that less than one
percent of pending suits were diversity class actions. While this percentage would
increase if aggregation were allowed in diversity class actions, concern over the
federal case load would be better served by more comprehensive solutions than
restricting diversity class actions.
B. The Rationale of Zahn
In Zahn v. International Paper Co.," the Court considered the next in-
evitable situation: a class action involving separate and distinct claims where
some but not all claims exceed the jurisdictional amount requirement. The
Court, however, considered this additional factor irrelevant and held that in a
Rule 23 (b) (3) class action, each plaintiff must meet the jurisdictional amount
requirement or be dismissed.'
The Court first set forth the mandatory legislative framework: diversity
cases can be maintained only if the matter in controversy meets the requisite
jurisdictional amount. The Court then developed the aggregation doctrine and
reiterated two corollaries: (1) where none of the parties satisfy the jurisdictional
amount, the claims cannot be aggregated to meet the amount and (2) any party
who fails to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement must be dismissed,
irrespective of whether any other party has met it.
Examining these rules in relation to class actions, the Court noted that most
Courts of Appeals had held that in spurious class actions under the original Rule
23, separate and distinct claims could not be aggregated to meet the jurisdictional
amount requirement.' 9 The Court retreated from its position in Snyder by not
relying on Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.2" as the precedential basis for applying the
aggregation doctrine to class actions involving separate and distinct claims, only
some of which satisfied the jurisdictional amount.'
The Court did, however, rely heavily on Snyder as to "matter in contro-
versy" and the effect of procedural rules in jurisdictional determinations. It is
this reaffirmance of the primary importance of the jurisdictional amount require-
14 See address delivered by Honorable Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the United States
at the annual meeting of the American Law Institute, 25 F.R.D. 213 (1960).
15 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE Dnr=xToR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFicE OF THE UNrTED
STATES, at 187-88 (1972).
16 Id.
17 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
18 Id. at 301.
19 Id. 296-98.
20 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
21 The Court cites the Clark case only in support of the aggregation doctrine as to
separate and distinct claims and not as an expansion of the doctrine into class actions.
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ment that may have the most far-reaching effects. The Court implied that no
Supreme Court precedent exists for the situation where some class members
asserting separate and distinct claims do and others do not meet the jurisdictional
amount. Consequently, it reconstructs "matter in controversy" and its aggrega-
tion doctrine, fully endorses the Snyder development of these concepts, and most
importantly denies the relevance of procedural rules in jurisdictional determina-
tions.
Arguably, the Zalhn holding will not greatly decrease the federal case load
since, as in the Zahn case itself, those parties satisfying the jurisdictional amount
requirement may choose to remain in federal court. The only benefit would be
somewhat less complicated litigation.
The Court seems to suggest more than that the amendment to Rule 23 does
not change the aggregation doctrine as to separate and distinct claims in class
actions. It additionally notes that the aggregation doctrine does not rely on any
rule of procedure, despite the fact that procedural rules have often defined the
context in which jurisdiction would be applicable.
Zahn factually presents a Rule 23(b) (3) class action. Since the Court so
easily dismisses the relevance of this procedural categorization, however, it sug-
gests that other multiparty procedural devices that unite separate and distinct
claims may be subject to re-examination.
III. Ancillary Jurisdiction Consequences
The majority opinion in Zahn conspicuously refrained from any reference
to ancillary jurisdiction, despite strong dissent in the Court of Appeals and by
Justice Brennan supporting its application. The omission follows from the
Court's reliance on a traditionally strict interpretation of "matter in controversy"
and its sensitive awareness of the jurisdictional restrictions imposed by Rule 82:
Neither Rule 23 nor any other procedural rule can extend federal court jurisdic-
tion by circumventing the "matter in controversy" requirement. The application
of ancillary jurisdiction would arguably contradict the Rule 82 mandate and
thus present a problem which the majority apparently was not prepared to
discuss.
Ancillary jurisdiction rests on the theory that a court assumes jurisdiction
over the facts which constitute the plaintiff's claim and that the court therefore
has jurisdiction over any additional claims springing from those facts.2" Despite
its conceptual appeal, however, this theory fails to establish the limits to a court's
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction. As the core of facts grows, so does the concept
of ancillary jurisdiction. Ultimately, the continued growth of ancillary jurisdic-
tion would encroach upon express statutory restrictions on federal court jurisdic-
tion. Perhaps Zahn is most important as an indication of the Supreme Court's
concern that a growing concept of ancillary jurisdiction would conflict with
specific statutory limitations on federal court jurisdiction.
Counterpoised, then, are the general statements that no independent
22 Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 '(2d Cir. 1959).
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jurisdictional grounds are required for a claim ancillary to a suit over which the
court has jurisdiction and the jurisdictional requirement that separate and
distinct claims must individually satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement.
The Zahn rationale suggests that the latter succeed over the former.
It should be noted that where applicable, the diversity of citizenship require-
ment arises from the Constitution itself.23 Consequently, since it can be neither
avoided nor easily changed, courts have given a broad interpretation to the diver-
sity requirement. However, the jurisdictional amount requirement has been
imposed by Congress to regulate the workload of the federal courts. Con-
sequently, the courts have tended to read this part of the total jurisdictional re-
quirement more narrowly. Indeed, the Court in Zahn suggests that the ir-
relevance of independent jurisdictional grounds once ancillary jurisdiction has
been established applies only to the diversity requirement and that the "matter
in controversy" restriction still requires that separate and distinct claims must
meet the requisite jurisdictional amount. Even where the court has jurisdiction
over some of the claims, if the claims are separate and distinct within the mean-
ing of Zahn, proper jurisdiction demands satisfaction of the "matter in con-
troversy" requirements irrespective of any procedural rules.24
If the jurisdictional amount requirement overrides any procedural rule, it
necessarily overrides the jurisdictional justification for these rules: ancillary
jurisdiction. In situations where ancillary jurisdiction would otherwise appear to
apply, it may now be tempered by the jurisdictional amount requirement. While
ancillary jurisdiction may obviate the necessity for diversity of citizenship, the
matter in controversy requirement has been reaffirmed as an independent and
apparently indispensable requirement.
Logical consistency would require that the Supreme Court's rationale in
Zahn be applied to analogous situations in which ancillary jurisdiction is used to
alleviate the jurisdictional amount requirement. This note will consider the
possible extension of the Zahn rationale to five of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: (1) Intervention (Rule 24), (2) Impleader (Rule 14(a)), (3)
Cross-Claims (Rule 13(g) ), (4) Compulsory Counterclaims (Rule 13(a) ), and
(5) Interpleader (Rule 22).
A. Intervention
Intervention allows one to become party to a suit which had not originally
included him. Rule 24(a) (2) gives an applicant the "right" to intervene where
he has both an inadequately represented interest in the action and the possibility
that disposition of the action will, as a practical matter, impair or impede his
ability to protect that interest. Rule 24(b) (2) allows "permissive" intervention
where the applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a common
question of law or fact.
Traditionally, the necessary jurisdictional basis depended on whether the
intervention was permissive or of right.25 Most courts hold that since permissive
23 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
24 414 U.S. at 299-300.
25 C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 75, at 327 (2d ed. 1970).
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intervention has merely a common question of law or fact to link it with the main
action, it must be supported by independent jurisdictional grounds.26 A few
courts, however, have required no independent jurisdictional grounds for per-
missive intervention." Since permissive intervention, like Rule 23(b) (3) class
actions, rests on only common questions of law or fact, the claims would by
nature almost always be separate and distinct, requiring that the intervenor
independently meet the jurisdictional amount requirement.
Ancillary jurisdiction has supported intervention of right primarily in situa-
tions involving the destruction of diversity by an intervenor." Thus while little
attention centered on the jurisdictional amount requirement, generalizations
arose that once an intervenor's claim qualified as ancillary to the main action,
no other independent jurisdictional grounds were required. These two pro-
cedural devices differ in that a class action allows representative parties to bring
suit on behalf of numerous parties with appropriately related claims, whereas
intervention of right allows certain claimants to become party to a suit not
already including them. For analysis purposes, however, the common denomi-
nator between a Rule 23 (b) (3) class action and intervention of right under
Rule 24(a) (2) will be a multiparty suit involving separate and distinct claims,
some of which come within the jurisdiction of the court and some of which fail
to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement.
While no clear line of cases has specifically addressed the jurisdictional
amount requirement for intervention of right under amended Rule 24(a) (2),
independent jurisdictional grounds were not required for pre-amendment inter-
vention of right.29 Intervention of right was deemed to come within the ancillary
jurisdiction of the court since by its nature it involved a claim or defense clearly
related to the main claim. However, since the Court in Zahn felt so strongly
bound by Rule 82 forbidding procedural expansion of jurisdiction and
myopically focused on joint and common as compared to separate and distinct
claims in a multiparty litigation, an applicant qualifying for the right to intervene
may also have to establish the requisite jurisdictional amount.
The conflict will arise whenever the requirements for intervention of right
vary from those for determining whether claims are joint and common rather
than separate and distinct. Even though an intervenor may have a claim separate
and distinct from the main action, he may still have a sufficient "interest" in the
transaction to qualify for the first requirement of intervention of right. Addition-
ally, the second requirement that the disposition of the matter may impair or
impede the applicant's ability to protect the interest has been held to include even
26 See, e.g., Hunt Tool Co. v. Moore, Inc., 212 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1954).
27 See Northeast Clackamas County Electric Co-operative, Inc. v. Continental Casualty
Co., 221 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1955) (where the court noted that while intervention of right
had been established, permissive intervention would also have been appropriate); United
States v. Local 638, Enterprise Association of Steam, Hot Water, Hydraulic Sprinkler, Pneu-
matic Tube, Compressed Air, Ice Machine, Air Conditioning and General Pipefitters, 347
F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (noting that the Supreme Court has not yet decided when
permissive intervention may be allowed in the absence of independent jurisdictional basis).
28 See, e.g., Black v. Texas Employers Insurance Ass'n, 326 F.2d 603 '(10th Cir. 1964).
29 See, e.g., Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104 (8th Cir. 1960).
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stare decisis effect;30 a judgment could easily have this effect on a common
question of law or fact in a separate and distinct claim.
Assuming, then, that the applicant's interest is not adequately represented,
an applicant with a claim separate and distinct from the main action might
qualify for intervention of right. For example, intervention of right has been
acknowledged in a class suit initiated for the fraudulent sale of short-term com-
mercial paper by a broker where additional parties representing holders of short
term senior paper and long-term debt of the issuer sought to intervene in the
class.5 While the court refused to allow intervention into the existing class since
their interests were conflicting, it noted that the additional parties could intervene
of right as a separate class under Rule 24(a) (2)." More simply, in a suit
against a broker on the sale of commercial paper, holders of debts and other
commercial paper of the issuer were recognized as having the right to intervene
even though their actions were based on separate instruments and transactions,
representing separate and distinct claims. Assuming additionally, then, that none
of the intervenors' claims exceeded the required jurisdictional amount, the same
procedural questions that faced the Court in Zahn may typically occur in the
context of intervention of right: separate and distinct claims, only some of which
meet the requisite jurisdictional amount.
Following the Zahn rationale, if parties cannot participate in a class action
of separate and distinct claims unless they meet the jurisdictional amount re-
quirement, there seems little reason to allow parties to intervene with separate
and distinct claims unless they too satisfy the minimum jurisdictional amount.3
Just as the practical categorizations of amended Rule 23 now have no jurisdic-
tionally determinative force where the claims are separate and distinct, the right
or permissive classification as to intervention would seem equally unimportant
as to such claims. Consequently, the right/permissive distinction, while the very
structural basis of Rule 24, may be meaningful only as to the diversity of citizen-
ship requirement. Rather than the law evolving to mitre procedural and juris-
dictional categorizations, the consequence of Zahn may be to further attenuate
any meaningful relation between the two.
B. Impleader
Impleader, or third party practice as it is called in Rule 14, permits a de-
fendant to bring in as a third party defendant one he claims is liable to him for all
or part of the plaintiff's claim against him.as Additionally, Rule 14 allows a
30 See, e.g., Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Finance Corp., 57 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. Ga.
1972).
31 Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc.. 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1972).
32 Id. at 1082.
33 The dissent in Zahn noted that"... the practical reasons for permitting adjudication
of the claims of the entire class are certainly as strong as those supporting ancillary jurisdic-
tion over . . . parties that are entitled to intervene as of right." Zahn v. International Paper
Co., 414 U.S. 291. at 307 (1973). If there is any merit to this contention, it could also be
asked whether individual jurisdictional amount requirements imposed on an entire class would
also be a requirement in determining ancillary jurisdiction over intervention of right.
34- FED. IL Civ. P. 14 provides in part:
'(a) When Defendant May Bring in Third Party. At any time after commence-
ment of the action a defending party, as a third party plaintiff, may cause a summons
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plaintiff to implead in response to a counterclaim and an impleaded party to im-
plead another in response to the third party claim.
Jurisdiction over the impleaded party and over the new claims generated
by the addition of the new party has consistently been based on ancillary juris-
diction, usually without inquiry as to whether independent jurisdictional bases
would support the addition of the new party." The inclusion of a third party de-
fendant may well entail the joinder of new claims. Not only does Rule 14 provide
that each party is entitled to assert claims against the impleaded party, but also
that the impleaded party may assert claims against the third party plaintiff, the
original plaintiff, and any other impleaded party.
Whether the Zahn rationale should be extended to this particular third
party practice must be considered with respect to each type of claim which may
arise from the impleader procedure: (1) the third party plaintiff's claim against
the third party defendant; (2) the plaintiff's claims against the third party de-
fendant; (3) the third party defendant's claims against the plaintiff; and (4)
joinder of claims by the third party plaintiff against the third party defendant.
1. Third Party Plaintiff's Claims Against Third Party Defendant
The third party plaintiff's claim against the third party defendant in the im-
pleader procedure clearly relies on ancillary jurisdiction as a jurisdictional basis."
In Zahn, where the claims were separate and distinct, the Court required that
each of the claimants satisfy the statutorily determined amount in controversy,
regardless of ancillary jurisdiction. Whether the Zahn rationale could be said
to apply to the claim of a third party plaintiff against a third party defendant
depends on the interpretation of "separate and distinct" as used by the Supreme
Court.
There are several ways in which a third party plaintiff's claim against a
third party defendant might be considered separate and distinct from the
plaintiff's original claim. Rule 14 does not require the assertion of a third party
claim in the same suit, but allows the defendant to assert his claim against the
third party defendant in a separate action, if he prefers."' In fact, the court has
and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action who is or may
be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him .... The third
party defendant may also assert any claim against the plaintiff arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against
the third party plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim against the third party
defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the plaintiff's claim against the third party plaintiff. .. A third party defendant
may proceed under this rule against any person not a party to the action who is or
may be liable to him for all or part of the claim made in the action against the third
party defendant ....
(b) When Plaintiff May Bring in Third Party. When a counterclaim is asserted
against a plaintiff, he may cause a third party to be brought in under circumstances
which under this rule would entitle a defendant to do so.
35 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Atlantic States Gas Co., 167 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1948); Williams
v. Keyes, 125 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1942); Lankford v. Ryder Truck System, Inc., 41 F.R.D.
430 (D.S.C. 1967); Berkey v. Rockwell Spring & Axle Company, 162 F. Supp. 493 (W.D.
Pa. 1958).
36 See, e.g., Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corporation, 29 F. Supp. 112 (D. Conn.
1939) ; Satink v. Holland Tp., 28 F. Supp. 67 (D.N.J. 1939) ; Tullgren v. Jasper, 27 F. Supp.
413 (D.Md. 1939).
37 See, e.g., Union Paving Co. v. Thomas, 9 F.R.D. 612 (D. Pa. 1949).
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the discretion not to allow the impleader of a third party, thereby requiring that
it be brought in a separate action, if at all1 Obviously then, the impleader
action may be sufficiently distinct to allow a separate trial of that claim and to
compel a separate action if the possibility of prejudice outweighs the benefits of
judicial economy. Morever, the third party claim may be based on a theory
entirely separate from that of the original claim: for example, where contractual
indemnity is sought for liability in a tort action. 9 In such a case the two claims
are separate and distinct at least with regard to the theory on which recovery is
sought.
In other respects, however, such claims may not be properly considered
"separate and distinct." Impleader is available only against a third person "who
is or may be liable" to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against
him."0 Inasmuch as the third party plaintiff's claim against the third party de-
fendant is based upon the anticipated liability of the third party plaintiff to the
original plaintiff, the two claims may not be regarded as entirely separate and
distinct. Post-Zahn characterization of "separate and distinct" is thus crucial in
determining whether the rationale of that case should logically be applied to a
third party plaintiffs claim against a third party defendant. If the impleaded
claim is deemed "separate and distinct," Zahn would seem to indicate that such
a claim must be held to the statutory requirement as to jurisdictional amount.
2. Plaintiff's Claims Against Third Party Defendant
Rule 14 also allows the plaintiff to assert any claim against the third party
defendant which arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third party plaintiff."1 Here the ques-
tion of whether the Zahn rationale precludes the use of ancillary jurisdiction is
moot since the courts have imposed the requirement that such claims must be
based on independent jurisdictional grounds." The reason usually given for this
is the fear of collusion between the plaintiff and third party plaintiff to allow
the plaintiff to sue the third party defendant indirectly when he would not have
had jurisdiction to sue him directly.43 Thus the jurisdictional requirement as to
amount in controversy is enforced for reasons distinct from the Zahn rationale.
3. Third Party Defendant's Claims Against Plaintiff
A third party defendant's claims against the plaintiff are similarly allowed
by Rule 14 where the claims arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
38 See, e.g., Somportex Limited v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435
(3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972); United States v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709
(10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 975 '(1954); Greene v. Kitner, 279 F. Supp. 745
(M.D. Pa. 1968).
39 See, e.g., Travelers Insurance Co. v. Busy Electric Co., 294 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1961).
40 See note 34 supra.
41 Id.
42 See, e.g., McPherson v. Hoffman, 275 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1960); Schwab v. Erie
Lackawanna Railroad Company, 303 F. Supp. 1398 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
43 See, e.g., Hoskie v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 39 F. Supp. 305 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
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subject matter of the plaintiff's original claim against the third party plaintiff."
The rule apparently characterizes these claims as ancillary to the plaintiff's
original claim. Yet the courts are split as to whether a claim of this type falls
within the courts' ancillary jurisdiction or whether the added claim requires an
independent jurisdictional basis. Some courts have required an independent
jurisdictional basis simply because the plaintiff would have to show independent
grounds of jurisdiction for any claims against the third party defendant.45 Other
courts have rejected the "quasi-mutuality argument" in favor of allowing an-
cillary jurisdiction. 6
The latter view is the more cogent. Assume that A sues B and B impleads C.
If A would not have had subject matter jurisdiction in a suit directly against C,
then A could bring a collusive action against B merely to have B implead C. Once
added as a party, ancillary jurisdiction would allow A to assert his claims against
C, thereby allowing A to do indirectly what he could not do directly. Thus the
courts, as a protective measure, require that for every claim by A against C in
an impleader action, such claim must be supported by independent jurisdictional
bases.
These reasons, however, do not support a denial of ancillary jurisdiction for
C's claims against A. The possibility of collusion seems remote since there is little
likelihood that a third party defendant could (a) find a suit in which the would-
be adversary is suing a defendant who would implead the third party defendant
and (b) have a claim against the plaintiff that arises out of the same transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original claim. In other words, the
possibility of collusion to make such a claim is so remote that there is little reason
not to utilize ancillary jurisdiction.
Where ancillary jurisdiction is held to support the third party defendant's
claims against the plaintiff, however, the Zahn rationale should find application.
Such a claim may often be regarded as separate and distinct from the plaintiff's
claim against the third party plaintiff, despite the fact that it must have arisen
from the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's claim."' If such a claim
by the third party defendant against the plaintiff is "separate and distinct" within
the meaning of Zahn, then it is inconsistent with Zahn to allow ancillary juris-
diction to circumvent the statutory requirement as to amount in controversy.
4. Joinder of Claims by Third Party Plaintiff
Finally, it should be noted that Rule 18(a) allows a third party plaintiff to
join as many claims as he has against a third party defendant. Courts have held
that ancillary jurisdiction applies to such claims where they arise out of the
same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's claim against the third party
44 See note 34 supra.
45 See, e.g., Shverha v. Maryland Cas. Co., 110 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
46 See, e.g., Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709 (5th
Cir. 1970).
47 In the section dealing with "Counterclaims" infra, it is argued that two claims may




plaintiff."8 In other words, ancillary jurisdiction is used not only to support the
third party plaintiff's claim that the third party defendant is liable to him for any
damages owed to the original plaintiff, but also to support the joinder of any other
claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence. It may be argued that
such claims are separate and distinct despite the fact that they arise out of the
same transaction or occurrence. 9 If so, then the situation closely approximates
that in Zahn, and would thus render each claim subject to the jurisdictional
amount requirement regardless of ancillary jurisdiction."0
C. Cross-Claims
Gross-claims allow the adjudication of multiple claims in a multiparty suit.
Rule 13 (g) allows a party to assert against a coparty a claim which arises out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original claim
or a counterclaim, or relates to any property that is the subject matter of the orig-
inal action or of a counterclaim thereto. 1 Cross-claims which qualify under this
latter provision may also be deemed separate and distinct since a cross-claim
founded solely on the property involved in the action need not relate to the right
asserted in either the original claim or counterclaim. Where Rule 13 (g) allows
the assertion of cross-claims which may be considered separate and distinct from
the plaintiff's original claim within the meaning of Zahn, the Supreme Court's
rationale in that case would once again seem to find application.
Most courts have considered cross-claims to be within their ancillary juris-
diction and thus have not required independent jurisdictional bases.52 While
most of these cases have addressed the issue with regard to the diversity require-
ment, ancillary jurisdiction has also been upheld where the jurisdictional amount
requirement was lacking. In Coastal Air Lines v. Dockery," Coastal had leased an
aircraft from Dockery with an option to buy. The plane was insured by Rhode
Island Insurance Company. When the aircraft was destroyed in a crash, Dockery
agreed to settle with Coastal for the purchase price. Dockery then sued the in-
surance company to recover on the policy and the insurance company inter-
48 See, e.g., Crompton-Richnond Co., Inc., Factors v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 219
"(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
49 See note 47 supra.
50 There is, of course, a distinction. In Zahn the complainants sought jurisdiction over
additional parties, whereas the issue here involves jurisdiction over additional claims of parties
already within the court's jurisdiction. But the distinction lacks merit. In Zahn the Court
was faced with the duty of adjudicating the rights of the class as a class, not as individuals.
So the number of people to be included in the class was irrelevant. The Court's concern was
not with the complexity of the suit, but with the statutory requirement as to amount in con-
troversy. This remains a concern where ancillary jurisdiction is used to allow the joinder
of claims in circumvention of statutory requirements.
51 Fw. R. Crv. P. 13(g) provides:
Cross-Claim Against Co-Party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim
by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein or
relating to any property that is the subject matter of the original action. Such cross-
claim may include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be
liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against
the cross-claimant.
52 See, e.g., Childress v. Cook, 245 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1957).
53 180 F.2d 874 (8th Cir. 1950).
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pleaded Dockery and Coastal. Dockery cross-claimed against Coastal for rent
due under the lease. The rent claimed was well below the $10,000 requirement.
Yet the Eighth Circuit found that "cross-claims permitted by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure are regarded as ancillary to the principal claim to which they
are related and need not involve the jurisdictional sum necessary in an original
or independent action in District Court."5 4 In other words, the cross-claim for
rent, though separate and distinct from the claim on the insurance policy, was
considered ancillary to the insurance claim and thus did not fail for lack of
jurisdictional amount.
Apparently the pre-Zahn courts assumed that the jurisdictional amount re-
quirement was eliminated by ancillary jurisdiction in Rule 13 (g) cases. The rule
specifies that the cross-claimant may assert that the coparty is liable for part of
the claim asserted against the cross-claimant.5 "Part" of the claim against the
cross-claimant obviously might include amounts less than $10,000, yet Rule
13 (g) does not mention the jurisdictional amount requirement as a qualification
of the rule. In other words, Rule 13 (g) seems to require the use of ancillary
jurisdiction to enable a court to adjudicate cross-claims of less than $10,000.
This mandate of Rule 13(g) stands in juxtaposition with the Supreme Court's
decision in Zahn that rules of procedure may not be used to circumvent the
statutorily required amount.
D. Compulsory Counterclaims
A compulsory counterclaim is a claim which the defendant is required to
assert against the plaintiff.56 If the counterclaim is not asserted in the same suit as
the plaintiff's claim against the defendant, the defendant's claim is forever lost.
The penalty is thus fashioned to implement the purpose of the federal rules:
to avoid multiple litigation by the adjudication in a single suit of closely related
claims.
A counterclaim is compulsory under the federal rules where it arises out of
the transaction or occurrence which is the subject of the opposing party's claim.
There has been no successful attempt to define the meaning of the words "trans-
action or occurrence." However, several interpretations have been suggested,
the most widely accepted of which appears in the landmark case, Moore v. New
York Cotton Exchange: "'Transaction' is a word of flexible meaning. It may
comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the im-
mediateness of their connection as upon their logical relationship." In other
words, claims may be considered to have arisen out of the same transaction or
occurrence if they pass the "logical relationship" test. The words "logical rela-
54 Id. at 877.
55 See note 51 supra.
56 FED. R_ Crv. P. 13(a) provides in part:
Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim
which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party,
if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. . ..
57 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
58 Id. at 610.
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tionship" are as much in need of definition as is the phrase "transaction or oc-
currence." Again these words have received vague interpretation rather than
definition. Claims are deemed to have a logical relationship if they arise "out of
the same aggregate of operative facts as the original claim."59 And so the courts
continue to interpret the meaning of Rule 13 (a) without ever establishing defini-
tional limitations of the words "transaction or occurrence."
There is universal agreement that ancillary jurisdiction applies to com-
pulsory counterclaims."0 This unanimity results from an acknowledgment that
ancillary jurisdiction applies to the very circumstance which makes a counter-
claim compulsory:
The issue of the existence of ancillary jurisdiction and the issue as to
whether a counterclaim is compulsory are to be answered by the same test.
It is not a coincidence that the same considerations that determine whether
a counterclaim is compulsory decide also whether the court has ancillary
jurisdiction to adjudicate it. The tests are the same because Rule 13(a) and
the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction are designed to abolish the same evil,
viz., piecemeal litigation in the federal courts.0 '
More simply, the purpose of ancillary jurisdiction is to allow a court in a single
action to adjudicate claims which arise from the same "transaction or occur-
rence." Since a counterclaim is compulsory when it arises from the same trans-
action or occurrence as the original claim, ancillary jurisdiction finds perfect
application to compulsory counterclaims. Ancillary jurisdiction thus enables
Rule 13 (a) to compel counterclaims without regard to whether the statutory re-
quirements for jurisdiction have been met.
Since ancillary jurisdiction is applied to claims arising out of a given transac-
tion or occurrence, a more liberal interpretation of "transaction or occurrence"
results in the inclusion of more claims and a corresponding growth in the concept
of ancillary jurisdiction. In other words, as the meaning of "transaction or oc-
currence" is expanded, so is the application of ancillary jurisdiction. To the
extent that no definitional limitations have been put on the logical relationship
test, neither have the limitations of ancillary jurisdiction been established. The
concept has thus been appropriately labelled "amorphous.
6 2
Despite the fact that the plaintiff's claim and a compulsory counterclaim
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, in some respects they may be
separate and distinct. The two claims may be based on separate theories of
recovery and require different elements of proof. For example, in United States
v. Rogers & Rogers63 the plaintiff sued the defendant to recover the purchase
price of concrete. The defendant counterclaimed that the concrete was used
negligently. The district court found the counterclaim to be compulsory, despite
59 Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 715 (5th Cir.
1970).
60 See, e.g., United States v. Heyward-Robinson Co., Inc., 430 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971); Defy v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 '(2d Cir. 1959).
61 Great Lakes Rubber Corporation v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 633-34
(3d Cir. 1961).
62 53 HAav. L. Rav. 449, 458 (1940).
63 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.Cal. 1958).
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the fact that the counterclaim was founded on negligence and the original claim
was grounded in contract. The two claims thus presented separate and distinct
legal theories of recovery although they arose from common facts.
One might object that it is contradictory to assert, first, that two claims
share a common origin and, second, that they are also separate and distinct from
each other. Yet this anomalous result necessarily flows from the Zahn decision.
In Zahn, the claims sought to be asserted were adjudged separate and distinct
even though they arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions64 and
bore a logical relation to one another. It follows, then, that in other situations
claims might be found to be separate and distinct within the meaning of Zahn
even though they arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. If the result is
anomalous, the Supreme Court has authored the anomaly.
If counterclaims are determined to be separate and distinct from the original
claim in Rule 13(a) cases, Zahn would indicate that each of these counterclaims
must meet the jurisdictional amount requirement. If the Supreme Court's
refusal in Zahn to use ancillary jurisdiction is to be regarded the rule, then
ancillary jurisdiction may not always be used to circumvent the jurisdictional
amount requirement as to compulsory counterclaims. The federal courts may in
some situations lack power to exercise jurisdiction over counterclaims unless the
amount in controversy as to each counterclaim exceeds $10,000.
E. Interpleader
Interpleader is the procedure which allows a plaintiff to join as defendants
two or more persons having claims which must be satisfied out of a fund held by
the plaintiff.65 Interpleader requires that the claimants litigate among themselves
in order to determine the manner in which the fund is to be distributed.
The purpose of interpleader was originally to protect the stakeholder from
multiple liability beyond the amount of the fund. It has since been acknowledged
that the interpleader device protects the claimants as well:
Were an insurance company required to await reduction of claims to
judgment, the first claimant to obtain such a judgment or to negotiate a
settlement might appropriate all or a disproportionate slice of the fund
before his fellow claimants were able to establish their claims. The diffi-
culties such a race to judgment pose for the insurer, and the unfairness
which may result to some claimants, were among the principal evils the
interpleader device was intended to remedy.66
64 "Transaction" has been held to include a series of transactions. G & M Tire Co. v.
Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp., 36 F.R.D. 440, 441 (N.D. Miss. 1964).
65 FED. R. Civ. P. 22(1) provides:
Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as defendants and
required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be
exposed to double or multiple liability. It is not ground for objection to the joinder
that the claims of the several claimants or the titles on which their claims depend
do not have a common origin or are not identical but are adverse to and indepen-
dent of one another, or that the plaintiff avers that he is not liable in whole or in
part to any or all of the claimants. A defendant exposed to similar liability may
obtain such interpleader by way of cross-claim or counterclaim. The provisions of
this rule supplement and do not in any way limit the joinder of parties permitted
in Rule 20.
66 State Farm Fire & Cas. Company v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
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Interpleader is available under either of two provisions: 28 U.S.C. § 1335
or Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.67 Rule 22 interpleader is
subject to the same statutory requirements for jurisdiction as are the other federal
rules."
Though ancillary jurisdiction has been applied to Rule 22 interpleader in
lieu of the diversity requirement, it has never been used to circumvent the re-
quirement as to amount in controversy. Ancillary jurisdiction has not been
needed to handle the situation in which one of the claimants is claiming less than
the amount specified by statute since the amount in controversy is deemed to be
the entire fund rather than each individual claim: "In interpleader actions under
Rule 22, the matter in controversy is measured by the fund to be distributed as
stated by the plaintiff."
70
It would seem logical in an interpleader action that the amount in con-
troversy should be the total fund to be distributed among the claimants. How-
ever, the Zahn rationale seems to require that the amount in controversy be
determined as to each claimant, necessitating the dismissal of any claim which
failed to meet the requisite jurisdictional amount. Such a requirement would
not only be impractical but would also defeat the purpose of Rule 22.
For example, assume that the fund is $15,000. If one claimant seeks
damages of $15,000 whereas the other claimants have been injured only to the
amount of $9,000 apiece, then Zahn would require that the federal court accept
only the single claim for $15,000. If the full amount were awarded to the single
claimant, there would be manifest injustice to other claimants having valid
claims to portions of the fund, but who could not get into federal court for lack
of jurisdiction. The result would be multiple litigation and disproportionate
distribution of the fund, the very evil Rule 22 is designed to remedy. 1
Rule 22 allows the joinder of claimants though their claims do not have a
"common origin" and even though the claims are "independent of one an-
other.""2 In other words, Rule 22 specifically recognizes separate and distinct
claims. A strict application of the Zahn rationale to Rule 22 would result in the
conclusion that each of the claimants in an action for interpleader must claim
more than $10,000 before a federal court will have jurisdiction over the claim.
Thus, where there are numerous small claims to a limited fund in excess of
$10,000, Zahn would deny Rule 22 interpleader on jurisdictional grounds.
Perhaps it is not a valid objection that the Zahn rationale would defeat
the purpose of Rule 22. It would have seemed that Rule 23 class action proce-
dure contemplates that the amount in controversy should be determined to be
the damage done to the class. Yet the Supreme Court required that each claim-
ant meet the jurisdictional amount requirement as to each individual claim.
67 See note 65 supra.
68 See, e.g., Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Nichols, 363 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1966).
69 Where a disinterested stakeholder brought an interpleader action against two alien
claimants under Rule 22 and the diversity statute, ancillary jurisdiction was granted over
the dispute between the aliens when the stakeholder deposited the fund and was discharged.
Republic of China v. American Express Co., 195 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1951).
70 United Benefit Life Insurance Company v. Leech, 326 F. Supp. 598, 600 (E.D. Pa.
1971).
71 See note 66 supra.
72 See note 65 supra.
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Both Rule 22 and Rule 23 would appear to be designed to reduce multiple and
vexatious litigation. Yet the Supreme Court in Zahn left the defendant exposed
to multiple liability from members of the class who were damaged but whose
claims were not large enough to merit cognizance in federal court. If the Su-
preme Court remained unswayed by the possibility of multiple litigation in
Rule 23 procedures, there seems little reason to believe that this argument would
be persuasive in a Rule 22 procedure.
But strict logic here operates to achieve a most unacceptable result. Rule
22 interpleader, a procedure which seeks to achieve a commendable result, could
conceivably be bound by a narrow interpretation of amount in controversy. In
effect, the logical extension of Zahn could cripple Rule 22 interpleader.
IV. Conclusion
Ancillary jurisdiction allows a court to adjudicate in a single action all
closely related parties and claims.73 In allowing or compelling claims which
arise from a common origin or the same transaction or occurrence, the federal
rules address the same situation which ancillary jurisdiction is designed to sup-
port. 4 Practical considerations of judicial efficiency require that a court ad-
judicate all closely related claims at the same time. Commonsense considerations
require the use of ancillary jurisdiction to effect these objectives where jurisdic-
tional requirements would otherwise pose a barrier.
The federal rules have stimulated the liberal use of ancillary jurisdiction."5
This trend toward ancillary jurisdiction has continued since the adoption of
the federal rules in 1938. Absent specific limitations, the words "transaction or
occurrence" have received an increasingly broad interpretation. The concept
of ancillary jurisdiction, therefore, has grown to facilitate the increasingly liberal
interpretations of the federal rules. If the concept is indeed amorphous, it is
so of necessity.
The Supreme Court in Zahn may well have recognized the likelihood of a
collision between ancillary jurisdiction and a congressional decree designed to
limit jurisdiction. The majority opinion in Zahn did not directly deal with the
problem of ancillary jurisdiction, despite the dissents by Justice Brennan and
Judge Timbers in the Court of Appeals' decision, both of which recommended
its application. The majority opinion did, however, deal with the concept at least
indirectly in its refusal to use ancillary jurisdiction in what appeared to be a
traditionally appropriate situation. Furthermore, in insisting that rules of proce-
dure could not be used to obviate the statutory requirement as to amount in
controversy, the Court implicitly limited the jurisdictional basis for these proce-
dural rules.
Zahn leaves us with a problem as to other procedural devices which are
subject to the jurisdictional amount statutes. The federal rules described above
recognize claims to which the Zahn rationale might be applied. Logical con-
73 C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTs, § 76, at 336 (2d ed. 1970).
74 See note 61 supra.
75 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 23, at 95 (Rules Ed.
1960).
[December 1974]
sistency would require the extension of the reasoning in Zahn to analogous
situations. However, such an extension, though logically consistent with the
rationale used in Ztahn, should not and probably will not be realized.
The rationale of Zahn may well undercut the concept of ancillary juris-
diction and thus severely limit the use of those federal procedural rules depen-
dent upon ancillary jurisdiction. This inevitably results from the conflict be-
tween the statutory jurisdictional amount requirement which limits jurisdiction
and the concept of ancillary jurisdiction which supports a more expansive
interpretation of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has bowed to the legislative
mandate. Consequently, any solution to this problem must come from Con-
gress." Additionally, a legislative reappraisal of "matter in controversy" would




76 It should be noted that a bill was proposed in the House of Representatives on July
29, 1974, which would amend Title 28 of the United States Code to permit the cumulation
of amounts in controversy as between members of a class for the purposes of United States
district court jurisdiction in class actions. The proposed bill is currently under scrutiny by
the Committee on the Judiciary. See H.R. 16152, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. '(1974).
If the consequences of the Zahn decision are sought to be overturned by congressional
decree, it seems unlikely that the rationale of that case would be willingly extended to other
procedural devices.
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